In this paper, we provide new and complementing international evidence on the relation between cash holdings, corporate governance, and firm value. Our sample consists of a crosssection of 1,875 firms from 46 countries in 2007. We construct eight different measures of firm-level corporate governance based on 64 individual governance attributes provided by Governance Metrics International (GMI). We present three new main findings. First, firms with poor firm-level governance hold significantly more cash than firms with better firm-level governance. Second, we document a positive effect of cash holdings on firm value for firms with good firm-level corporate governance. A likely explanation is that in firms with weak firmlevel governance, higher cash holdings might be exploited by the management and invested in negative-NPV projects. Third, we find that a payout of excess cash by means of dividend payments, which reduces the possibility for managers to waste cash on negative-NPV projects, also positively affects the valuation effect of cash holdings. Moreover, firms with comparatively low firm-level corporate governance can still profit from cash holdings if they maintain relatively high dividend payout ratios. We control for country-level corporate governance in our analyses but find its effect to be limited and dominated by the effect of firm-level governance. 
Introduction
Holding liquid assets such as cash can be a double-edged sword for a firm. On the one hand, it provides flexibility to firms allowing them to avoid costs from underinvestment in positive-NPV projects due to lack of resources. On the other hand, cash holdings are prone to be invested in negative-NPV projects by managers or directors aiming to extract private benefits, an argument developed by Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) .
While there is a wide range of empirical research on the value of cash holdings when the underinvestment problem is prevalent (e.g., Mikkelson and Partch, 2003; Almeida et al., 2004) , the existing studies on both U.S. and international firms have failed to provide evidence that poor firm-level governance is linked to higher cash holdings or that the combination of high cash holdings and poor firm-level governance has negative effects on firm values. Harford (1999) and Opler et al. (1999) , for example, find no significant relationship between cash holdings and firm-level corporate governance. More recent U.S. evidence by Harford et al. (2008) suggests that firms with poor governance do not hold more but actually less cash, but that among a set of firms with high cash holdings, firms with poor governance spend their cash more quickly. Kalcheva and Lins (2007) investigate these issues in an international context. Across all countries of their international sample, they find no significant relationship between firm-level governance and cash holdings, or between firm-level governance, cash holdings, and firm value. The benefit of using an international sample stems from the possibility to introduce an additional dimension of corporate governance, namely country-level governance. The findings presented by Kalcheva and Lins (2007) suggest that once differences in country-level governance are taken into account, firm values are indeed lower when poor firm-level governance is combined with high cash holdings. A serious drawback of this study is their measure of firm-level governance which is restricted to management and family control rights. These reflect only one specific aspect of corporate governance. Moreover, the relation between this variable and firm value has been shown to be nonlinear (e.g., McConnell and Servaes, 1990) or insignificant when accounting for the endogeneity of manager ownership (e.g., Loderer and Martin, 1997) .
In this paper, we improve on the measures of firm-level corporate governance used in earlier international studies investigating the relationship between cash holdings and corporate governance, and the effect of these two variables -and their interaction -on firm value.
In a cross-section of between 1,655 and 1,875 firms from 46 countries, we use 64 governance attributes provided by Governance Metrics International (GMI) for the year 2007 to construct eight different measures of firm-level corporate governance. We find results which are in stark contrast to prior studies including the international results obtained by Kalcheva and Lins (2007) .
1 Our three main findings are the following: First, we document a strong negative relationship between firm-level corporate governance and cash holdings. Consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis, firms with relatively poor governance hold significantly more cash than their better governed peers. This finding is novel and in contrast to the existing U.S. evidence, which shows a positive relationship between firm-level governance and cash holdings (e.g., Harford et al., 2008) , and the existing international evidence, which fails to document any significant relationship between cash holdings and firm-level corporate governance (e.g., Kalcheva and Lins, 2007) . We further present evidence that this relationship is somewhat dampened for firms in countries with weak shareholder rights protection. Second, we document that in general higher cash holdings have a positive effect on firm value. We further show, however, that this positive effect is not prevalent in all firms but is restricted to firms with comparatively high firm-level corporate governance. In other words, to benefit from cash holdings, firms have to have a good corporate governance in 1 Unfortunately, it is not possible to pin down these differences in results to either the corporate governance variables used or the sample year as our corporate governance data is not available for 1996, the sample year used in Kalcheva and Lins (2007) , and generally not before 2003 (when coverage was still very sparse). On the other hand, the measures of manager and family control used in Kalcheva and Lins (2007) are not available for 2007, our sample year.
place. The flipside of this explanation, of course, is that firms with poor firm-level governance do not benefit from holding more liquid assets because such firms are not successful in impeding managers from extracting private benefits from cash holdings. This finding also holds when we control for country-level corporate governance. Third, we investigate whether the value of cash holdings depends on the firms' payout policy as a payout of excess cash reduces the possibility for managers to waste cash for negative-NPV projects. Our results show that interaction terms between cash holdings and the payout ratio, between cash holdings and corporate governance, and between corporate governance, cash holdings, and the payout ratio are all positive and significant. Hence, our results indicate that the value of cash is not only positively related to the companies' corporate governance but also to their dividend payments. In other words, cash is only valuable to a firm if either a sound corporate governance structure or a payout of excess cash (or both) reduce the possibility for managers to waste cash for negative-NPV projects. Moreover, by looking at sub-samples of poorly and well governed firms separately, we show that firms with poor corporate governance can still profit from cash holdings if they maintain relatively high dividend payout ratios.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and construction of variables used in this study. Section 3 presents the results from the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
Data and variables
In this section, we first describe the corporate governance data and then the financial variables used in this study.
Corporate governance data
We use data on firm-level corporate governance attributes provided by Governance Metrics International (GMI), which started providing governance data in 2003. GMI constructs a governance rating for all firms covered in their database using a proprietary scoring algorithm. To construct these ratings (which we do not use in this paper), GMI assembles information on individual governance attributes. We use 64 such individual governance attributes for the construction of our measures of firm-level corporate governance. The starting point for our sample are all firm-year observations in 2007. The reason for our focus on 2007 is that GMI broadened its coverage in 2007 considerably, and the number of countries covered by GMI nearly doubled in 2007. Since our purpose is to investigate firm-level as well as country-level governance, a sample covering more countries leads to a higher variance in country-level governance and hence is better suited for our analysis. Our cross-section consists of 1,875 observations from 46 different countries.
For each of the 64 governance attributes gathered, GMI assesses if a firm attains a minimum level of implementation. The 64 attributes we consider are sub-categorized by GMI into six categories, namely 1) board accountability, 2) financial disclosure and internal control, 3) shareholder rights, 4) remuneration, 5) market for control, and 6) corporate behavior.
We code a value of one to each governance attribute that a firm has in place and zero otherwise. Table 1 provides an overview of the 64 governance attributes and shows the percentage of firms meeting these criteria according to GMI's thresholds. A comparison of Table 1 with corresponding results from studies using other databases of international firm-level corporate governance such as ISS (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2009) Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009) . These are the governance attributes 10, 20, 25, 30, 32, 33, 40, 46, 47, 52, and 54 . The second set of four governance indices is computed similarly, the only difference being that these indices measure the percentage of governance attributes a company has in place relative to all 64 attributes 2 The corporate governance attributes summarized in the corporate behavior category are not covered by the other well-known governance rating agencies such as for example ISS. Hence, these attributes are not included in other international corporate governance studies (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2009; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009 
Financial data
We obtain the financial data for the companies included in our sample from Worldscope.
Following the literature on cash holdings (e.g., Dittmar et al., 2003; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007) , our measure of cash is defined as the ratio of cash and short-term investments to net assets, where net assets are defined as total assets minus cash and short-term investments.
We use Tobin's Q as the measure for firm value and compute it as total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, divided by total assets. We control for several variables which have been shown to explain variation in cash and firm value. To control for firm size, we use the natural logarithm of total assets. To control for leverage, we use the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. To control for a firm's potential investment opportunities, we use the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. To control for profitability, we employ the ratio of cash flow to net assets, where cash flow is defined as earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation minus interest payment minus dividend payments. Furthermore, we include industry dummies, as defined by Campbell (1996) . In the regressions where cash is the dependent variable, we use two further control variables. To control for additional liquid assets, we use the ratio of non-cash net working capital to net assets, and to control for current and future performance, we use the year-before to year-end sales growth. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorize all financial variables at the 1 st and 99 th percentile, and to mitigate the effect of the skewed distribution of our cash variable, we follow the literature and use its logarithm in our empirical analyses. 
Empirical analysis
In this section, we first report the results of our analysis of cash holdings and then report the results of our firm-value analysis.
Cash holdings
In this sub-section, we perform regression analyses in which the level of cash is estimated as a function of several different measures of firm-level corporate governance, a measure of country-level shareholder protection, and control variables. Throughout all empirical analyses in the paper, we use White (1980) standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity.
4 Tables 3 and 4 report the results of these regression analyses where the log of our cash vari-3 Another commonality of our sample with other recent international samples is the large fraction of U.K. and Japanese firms in our sample. In unreported robustness tests, we find our results to be robust to the exclusion of either of these two countries and also of both countries simultaneously. 4 Our results remain unchanged if we use different types of standard errors, such as for example standard errors that are clustered at the country-level.
able is the dependent variable. In Table 3 , we test for the impact of firm-level corporate governance on firm cash holdings. In Columns (1) to (4), we use the four governance indices ignoring missing governance attributes and in Columns (5) to (8), we use the four governance indices that treat missing governance attributes as if they were not in place. The results presented in Table 3 show that regardless of which measure of firm-level corporate governance we use, its coefficient is always negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Because we control for factors that are closely linked to the liquidity needs of a firm such as growth opportunities or profitability, the negative relationship between firm-level corporate governance and cash holdings indicates that the management of poorly governed companies is more likely to hoard cash, possibly to extract private benefits from these liquid assets. On the other hand, country-level corporate governance does not seem to be significantly related to cash holdings as indicated by the insignificant coefficients on REV.
In Table 4 , we investigate whether the negative relationship between firm-level corporate governance and cash holdings depends on country-level governance. To do this, we add an interaction term between the anti-director index of La Porta et al. (1998) in its revised form (REV) as proposed by Djankov et al. (2006) and the firm-level governance measures. For every measure of firm-level corporate governance, the coefficient on the standalone firmlevel governance measures is again negative and significant, establishing that our findings in Table 3 that poorly governed companies hold more cash is also valid if we account for a possible interaction effect between firm-and country-level governance. In each column, the coefficient on the interaction term between firm-level-and country-level governance is positive but mostly insignificant (with the exception of Columns (1) to (3)). A positive coefficient on the interaction term indicates that companies with comparatively good governance (high CGI score) which are based in a country with comparatively good country-level governance (high REV score) will hold more cash. The coefficient on country-level governance is always negative but insignificant with two exceptions (Columns (1) and (3)). Hence, there is only very weak evidence that good country-level corporate governance is also associated with lower cash holdings.
Summarizing, our results on the determinants of firms' cash holdings presented in Table   3 provide strong evidence that higher cash holdings and firm-level corporate governance are negatively related, regardless of the variables we use to measure firm-level governance. The results reported in Table 4 provide some evidence that this negative relation is slightly weakened when country-level shareholder protection is weak.
Firm value
Before we investigate the interrelation between cash holdings and corporate governance and their effect on firm value, we assess the standalone impact of cash and firm-level governance on firm value. In Table 5 , we estimate models that include our eight different gov- 2007, the year our sample is based on. We thus refrain from drawing too strong conclusions from the negative coefficient on country-level governance. 5, 6 In Table 6 , we investigate whether controlling for country-level shareholder protection, higher levels of cash have a more beneficial effect on firm value if corporate governance is better, i.e., the possibilities for management to extract private benefits from cash holdings are reduced. We do this by including an interaction term between cash holdings and our governance indices in our analysis. In each column of Table 6 , this interaction term between cash holdings and firm-level corporate governance is positive and statistically significant at least at the 5% level with one exception (in Column 5 significant at the 10% level). The coefficient on the standalone firm-level governance is not changed by the inclusion of the additional interaction term and remains significantly positive in every model. This finding suggests that to capture the benefits of having more cash available, a company needs to have a well-functioning corporate governance in place to curb managers' possibilities to make ill use of the liquid assets at their disposal. The flipside of this explanation is that firms with comparatively poor corporate governance experience negative effects of cash holdings on firm value, precisely because the lack of shareholder protection and/or management oversight enables the misuse of cash for negative present value projects. We also note that the standalone coefficient on cash turns insignificant in all models of Table 6 , providing evidence that the positive effect of cash holdings across all companies documented in Table 5 vanishes once we account for the interaction of cash with governance. In other words, to benefit from higher cash holdings, firms have to have comparatively better corporate governance in place.
In unreported results, we also examine the effect that country-level corporate governance has on the findings reported in Table 6 . Previous research such as Kalcheva and Lins (2007) document that for cash to have a positive impact on firm value, not only firm-level governance but country-level governance has to be high as well. When we follow Kalcheva and
Lins (2007) and include an additional term that interacts firm-level governance, cash holdings, and country-level governance, we find this coefficient to be insignificant regardless of which measure for firm-level governance we use. This is not entirely surprising, keeping in mind the negative effect of country-level governance on firm value we documented in Tables 5 and 6. Our findings thus point into the direction that firm-level governance is the driving force in determining the positive effect of cash holdings on firm value with country-level governance playing a minor role.
Total dividend payment
One could hypothesize that among companies with poor firm-level corporate governance, those that payout cash to shareholders are more highly valued than those that stock cash (e.g., see La Porta et al., 2000) . Hence, we extend the analysis in Section 3.2 by accounting for the firms' payout to shareholders. To our knowledge, the only study attempting to relate the valuation effect of cash holdings not only to corporate governance but also to the firms' payout policy is Kalcheva and Lins (2007) . Most importantly, their results show that when country governance is weak, firm value is higher when companies pay dividends. However, the results on firm-level corporate governance, which is measured by managerial ownership only, are less clear. Most specifications suggest that paying a dividend is more valuable to shareholders of companies with a high managerial ownership.
We use two different approaches to investigate whether a higher payout ratio is more valuable to shareholders of poorly governed firms. In the first approach, we estimate similar regressions as in Table 6 and include two new variables. The first variable, PAYOUT, is defined as a firm's total dividend payments divided by its total assets. 7 In addition, we include an interaction term between PAYOUT and CASH to investigate whether the valuation effect of cash depends on the firm's payout policy. The results are reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 for the two alternative corporate governance indices CGIALL1 (Column 1) and CGIALL2 (Column 2), respectively. Consistent with previous findings, the coefficients on CGIALL1 and CGIALL2 are both positive and significant, the coefficient on CASH is negative and significant, and the interaction term between corporate governance and CASH is positive and significant in both columns indicating that only well-governed firms benefit from cash holdings. The coefficient on PAYOUT is positive and significant in both columns indicating that higher dividend payments are positively associated with firm value. Most importantly, the coefficients on the interaction term between CASH and PAYOUT are positive and significant in both columns. Hence, our results indicate that the value of cash is not only positively related to the companies' corporate governance but also to their dividend payments. In Columns 3 and 4, we additionally interact the interaction term between CASH and PAYOUT with the corporate governance variable. The coefficients on these three-way interaction terms are positive and significant in both columns while all other coefficients remain virtually unchanged. Hence, good firm-level corporate governance seems to reinforce the positive valuation effect a high payout ratio has on cash holdings and vice versa.
Summarizing, the results in the first four columns indicate that cash is only valuable to a firm if either a sound corporate governance structure or a payout of excess cash (or both)
reduce the possibility for managers to waste cash for negative-NPV projects.
In the second approach, we build sub-samples based on whether a company's corporate governance score is in the bottom or top quartile. 8 For these sub-samples we then estimate separate regressions which also include PAYOUT and an interaction term between PAY-OUT and CASH in addition to the control and governance variables included in the regressions reported in Table 6 . Based on our previous results, we would expect that the value of cash is higher in well governed firms and that in poorly governed firms the value of cash is higher in firms paying more dividends. The results are reported in Columns 5 to 8 of Table   7 . The regressions in Columns 5 and 7 include all firms with a CGIALL1 and a CGIALL2 score in the bottom quartile, respectively. Columns 6 and 8 include all firms with a CGI-ALL1 and a CGIALL2 score in the top quartile, respectively. The results show that, in accordance with the results in Table 6 , the coefficient on CASH is positive and highly significant at the 1% level in Columns 6 and 8 and borderline significant or insignificant in Columns 5 and 7. Hence, the positive effect of cash holdings on firm value is restricted to highgovernance firms while poorly governed firms seem not to be able to benefit from the flexibility that holding more cash offers, possibly due to increased agency conflicts. Most importantly, the interaction term between CASH and PAYOUT is positive and (borderline) significant in poorly governed firms only (i.e., Columns 5 and 7). Hence, consistent with Columns 1 to 4, these results show that in poorly governed firms the valuation effect of cash holdings depends on the firms' payout policy. Poorly governed firms profit from cash holdings only when they maintain relatively high dividend payout ratios.
For brevity's sake, we present the results in this sub-section only for the two first corporate governance indices, CGIAll1 and CGIAll2. However, all results continue to hold if we include the other six governance measures employed in the study.
Conclusions
In this paper, we provide new and complementing international evidence on the interrela- This table reports mean values for a cross-section of 1,855 observations for which data are available from Governance Metrics International (GMI) and Worldscope. The sample size is 1,655 for NWC and SALESGR and 1,848 for PAYOUT. CASH is the ratio of cash and equivalents to net assets. Net assets are total assets minus cash and short-term investments. Q is the market value of equity plus total assets less book value of equity, divided by total assets. LNTA is the log of total assets. LEV is total liabilities divided by total assets. CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. CF is the ratio of cash flows to net assets, where cash flows are operating income plus depreciation and amortization minus interest minus taxes minus dividends. NWC is the ratio of net working capital to net assets, where net working capital is current assets minus current liabilities minus cash and short-term investments. SALESGR is a firm's 1-year sales growth. DIV is the percentage of firms in a country that paid dividends. PAYOUT is the ratio of total dividend payments to total assets. -0.198 -0.195 -0.193 -0.200 -0.209 -0.206 -0.199 -0.199 (0.121 This table reports the results from cross-sectional regressions where CASH is the dependent variable. CASH is defined as the natural logarithm of cash and short-term investments divided by net assets, where net assets are defined as total assets minus cash and short-term investments. CGIALL1 is an additive governance index based on all 64 governance attributes listed in Table 1 . CGICORE1 is an additive governance index based on all 64 governance attributes listed in Table 1 except for those that fall into the category "Corporate Behavior". CIGRED1 is an additive governance index based on a sub-sample of the 64 governance attributes listed in Table1. This subsample consists of attributes 8 to 15, 19 and 20 from the "Board Accountability" category, attribute 25 from the "Financial Disclosure and Internal Control" category, attribute 30 from the "Shareholder Rights" category, attributes 35 and 40 from the "Remuneration category", and attributes 47, 52, and 53 from the "Market for Control" category. CGICL1 is an additive governance index based on those governance attributes that are also used by Chhaoccharia and Laeven (2009), namely attributes 10, 20, 25, 30, 32, 33, 40, 46, 47, 52, and 54. CGIALL2, CGICORE2, CGIRED2, and CGICL2 are additive governance indices based on the same governance attributes as the first four indices (CGIALL1, CGICORE1, CGIRED1, and CGICL1) but governance attributes where GMI was not able to obtain information on are considered to be not in place. REV is the revised anti-director index proposed by Djankov et al. (2006) . All control variables are explained in Table 2 . All regressions include industry dummy variables based on the industry groupings reported in Campbell (1996) . p-values are in parentheses below each coefficient and are robust to heteroskedasticity. *,**, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. This table reports the results from cross-sectional regressions where CASH is the dependent variable. CASH is defined as the natural logarithm of cash and short-term investments divided by net assets, where net assets are defined as total assets minus cash and short-term investments. The remaining variables are explained in Tables  2 and 3 . All regressions include industry dummy variables based on the industry groupings reported in Campbell (1996) . p-values are in parentheses below each coefficient and are robust to heteroskedasticity. *,**, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. This table reports the results from cross-sectional regressions where the dependent variable is Tobin's Q computed as market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity, divided by total assets. The remaining variables are explained in Tables 2 and 3 . All regressions include industry dummy variables based on the industry groupings reported in Campbell (1996) . p-values are in parentheses below each coefficient and are robust to heteroskedasticity. *,**, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. This table reports the results from cross-sectional regressions where the dependent variable is Tobin's Q computed as market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity, divided by total assets. PAYOUT denotes a firm's total dividend payments scaled by its assets. The remaining variables are explained in Tables 2 and 3 . Columns 5 and 7 use a sub-sample including the firms whose respective CGI score is in the bottom quartile. Columns 6 and 8 use a sub-sample including the firms whose respective CGI score is in the top quartile. All regressions include industry dummy variables based on the industry groupings reported in Campbell (1996) . p-values are in parentheses below each coefficient and are robust to heteroskedasticity. *,**, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
